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Abstract
A game with a continuum of players is described by a function assigning
payoff functions to players and satisfying some measurability properties. In this
note we establish the equivalence between several measurability assumptions
that have been made in the literature.
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1 Introduction
The study of games with a continuum of players was initiated by Schmeidler (1973).
His formalization of such games parallels that of normal form games with a finite
number of players given in Nash (1950) insofar as a payoff function is assigned to
every player in the game.
In the presence of a continuum of players, the way that payoff functions are as-
signed to players must satisfy some measurability properties in order for the game to
be amendable to analysis.
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However, several measurability assumptions have been made in the literature.
The goal of this note is to establish that many of these assumptions are equivalent,
therefore unifying apparently distinct results.
2 Definitions and Main Result
We consider games with a continuum of players in which each player has a separable
metric space of actions and a continuous payoff function that depends only on his
choice and on the distribution of actions.1 The set of players is represented by an
atomless probability space (T,Ξ, ϕ).
The set of actions is denoted by A, and we assume that it is a non-empty, separable
metric space. By a distribution of actions we mean a Borel probability measure on A.
Let P(A) be the space of Borel probability measures on A endowed with the weak*
topology (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Chapter 14)). By Aliprantis and Border
(1999, Theorem 14.12), it follows that P(A) is a compact metric space. We endow
both A and P(A) with the Borel σ-algebra induced by the corresponding topology.
Let U denote the space of real-valued continuous payoff functions defined on A×
P(A). The set U represents the space of players’ characteristics. We endow it with
the supremum norm, thus making it a complete and separable metric space, and with
the corresponding Borel σ-algebra.
A game with a continuum of players is defined by assigning a payoff function to
each player. Thus, it is characterized by a function U : T → U satisfying some
measurability property.
Several assumptions can be made regarding the measurability of U : (1) U is
measurable (Rath (1995), Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), Khan, Rath, and Sun (2006))
(2) the function (t, a, τ) 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable, (3) the function (t, a) 7→ g(t)(a, τ)
is measurable for all τ ∈ P(A) (Schmeidler (1973), Rath (1992), Balder (2002)), and
1Games with a continuum of players and a separable, but not necessarily compact, metric space
of actions have been consider in Khan and Sun (1995), Carmona (2007) and Carmona and Podczeck
(2007).
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(4) the function t 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable for all a ∈ A and τ ∈ P(A).
Intuitively, these assumptions are ordered in terms of their strength, with (1)
representing the strongest and (4) the weakest one. Proposition 1 strengthens this
relationship by showing that all the above assumptions are equivalent.
Proposition 1 Let g be a function from T into U such that g(T ) is separable. Then,
the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) g is measurable.
(2) The function (t, a, τ) 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable.
(3) The function (t, a) 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable for all τ ∈ P(A).
(4) The function t 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable for all a ∈ A and τ ∈ P(A).
Some remark are in place before we turn to the proof of Proposition 1. First,
Proposition 1 also holds when (T,Ξ, ϕ) is complete and there exists T ′ ⊆ T such that
ϕ(T ′) = 0 and g(T \ T ′) is separable. This implies that the probability distribution
ϕ◦g−1 on U has a separable support, the importance of which has been highlighted by
Khan (1989) and Rath (1996). Second, note that (4) implies that (t, a, τ) 7→ g(t)(a, τ)
is a Carathe´odory function, and hence measurable, i.e., (2) holds (see Aliprantis and
Border (1999, Lemma 4.50)). Third, it has been shown in Rath (1992, Remark 7)
that (1) implies (3).2 Forth, when A is compact, the equivalence between (1) and
(4) follows from Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 4.54). Fifth, Rath (1992,
Theorem 2) establishes the existence of a Nash equilibrium under the measurability
condition (1). It is remarked there that the result can also be established under (3)
using Lemma III.39 of Castaing and Valadier (1977). However, since (1) and (3) are
equivalent, this lemma is not required and the proof of Theorem 2 in Rath (1992)
applies verbatim to any of the measurability conditions considered here.
Our proof of Proposition 1 relies on a generalization of Theorem 4.54 in Aliprantis
and Border (1999).
2Rath (1995) assumes that A is compact, but his proof extends to the case when A is an arbitrary
metric space.
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Proposition 2 Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space, X a separable metric space, (Y, d) a
metric space and C(X, Y ), the space of continuous functions from X to Y , be endowed
with the metric δ(f, h) = supx∈X d(f(x), h(x)). If g is a function from S to C(X,Y )
such that g(S) is separable and s 7→ g(s)(x) is measurable for all x ∈ X, then g is
measurable.
Proof. Since g(S) ⊆ C(X, Y ) is separable, Z := g(S) is measurable and separa-
ble. Then, the class C = {Cε(f) ⊆ Z : ε > 0 and f ∈ Z} of closed balls generates the
Borel σ-algebra of Z. Indeed, if C is a closed subset of Z and D = {fn}∞n=1 ⊆ C is
countable and dense in C, then C = ∩∞k=1 ∪∞n=1 C1/k(fn).
As a result of the above, it follows that it is enough to show that g−1(Cε(f))
is measurable for all ε > 0 and f ∈ Z (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Corollary
4.23)). Let ε > 0 and f ∈ Z be arbitrary. Then,
g−1(Cε(f)) = {s ∈ S : δ(g(s), f) ≤ ε} = {s ∈ S : d(g(s)(x), f(x)) ≤ ε for all x ∈ X}
= ∩∞k=1{s ∈ S : d(g(s)(xk), f(xk)) ≤ ε},
where {xk}k is a dense subset of X. Since {s ∈ S : d(g(s)(xk), f(xk)) ≤ ε} is
measurable for all k, it follows that g−1(Cε(f)) is measurable.
We conclude with the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that (1) implies (2), (2) implies (3), (3)
implies (4) and (4) implies (1).
In order to show that (1) implies (2), define G : T × A× P(A)→ U × A× P(A)
by G(t, a, τ) = (g(t), a, τ) and pi : U × A × P(A) → R by pi(u, a, τ) = u(a, τ) for all
t ∈ T , a ∈ A, τ ∈ P(A) and u ∈ U . Then, pi is continuous and G is measurable,
implying that the function (t, a, τ) 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable since it equals pi ◦G.
We next show that (2) implies (3). Let τ ∈ P(A). Define α : T×A→ T×A×P(A)
by α(t, a) = (t, a, τ) and β : T ×A×P(A)→ R by β(t, a, ν) = g(t)(a, ν) for all t ∈ T ,
a ∈ A and ν ∈ P(A). Then, the function (t, a) 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable since it
equals β ◦ α.
We can show that (3) implies (4) in a similar way. Let a ∈ A and τ ∈ P(A).
Define γ : T → T × A by γ(t) = (t, a) and ρ : T × A → R by ρ(t, x) = g(t)(x, τ) for
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all t ∈ T and x ∈ A. Then, the function t 7→ g(t)(a, τ) is measurable since it equals
ρ ◦ γ.
Finally, it follows from Proposition 2 that (4) implies (1).
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